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Abstract
We combine an estimated monetary policy rule featuring time-varying trend in‡ation
and stochastic coe¢cients with a medium scale New Keynesian framework calibrated on
the U.S. economy. We …nd the impact of variations in trend in‡ation on the likelihood
of equilibrium determinacy to be both modest and limited to the second half of the
1970s. In contrast, our counterfactual exercises suggest that the change in the Federal
Reserve’s policy response to in‡ation is likely to have been the main driver leading the
U.S. economy to a unique equilibrium during the Great Moderation. We highlight the
impact of wage indexation on policymakers’ ability to induce economic stability, and
provide fresh evidence on the relationship between trend in‡ation, wage indexation and
determinacy in the post-WWII U.S. economic environment. Further simulations show
that rising the Federal Reserve’s in‡ation target to four percent would be consistent with
equilibrium uniqueness conditional on a policy as the one estimated on the U.S. post-1982
sample period.
JEL classi…cation: C22, E3, E43, E5.
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Trend In‡ation, Great Moderation, Determinacy, Wage
indexation.
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1 Introduction
One of the most popular interpretations of the U.S. Great Moderation involves the change in
the Federal Reserve’s systematic monetary policy. According to this view, monetary policy
became more aggressive at the end of the 1970s, when Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman
of the Federal Reserve and implemented an aggressive monetary policy that successfully drove
the U.S. economy on a low volatility-path (at least until the recent …nancial crises).1 Clar-
ida et al. (2000) estimate a variety of simple policy rules and …nd evidence consistent with
this explanation. A list of contributions, including Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and
Giannoni (2006), and Benati and Surico (2009) consolidate this …nding.
Some recent investigations (Hornstein and Wolman, 2005, Kiley, 2007 and Ascari and Ropele
2009), however, highlight the role of trend in‡ation in shaping the determinacy region in a
simple New Keynesian model. They show that the Taylor principle does not hold when trend
in‡ation occurs: the higher trend in‡ation is, the more aggressive the policy reaction to in‡ation
to guarantee determinacy must be. Intriguingly, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011a) (CG
henceforth) provide empirical support for the role of trend in‡ation in the Great Moderation.
Using an estimated monetary policy rule and a microfounded small scale AS/AD model that
features a fully-‡exible labor market, they show that the U.S. economy switched to determinacy
as a result both of the change in the Federal Reserve’s response to macroeconomic variables,
and of the decrease in trend in‡ation. They conclude that the reduction in trend in‡ation after
the mid-1980s is a necessary condition to achieve equilibrium uniqueness in the U.S. economy.
The role of trend in‡ation is clearly relevant from a policy standpoint. If low trend in‡ation
is fundamental to pin down a unique equilibrium and eliminate ine¢cient ‡uctuations, policy
makers should refrain from increasing it. On the other hand, an increase in trend in‡ation
would leave more room for conducting conventional monetary policy easings before hitting the
zero-lower bound, and would therefore give the Federal Reserve extra degrees of freedom when
facing dramatic economic downturns. Following this reasoning, Blanchard et al. (2010) recently
proposed to increase the in‡ation target pursued by the Federal Reserve to four percent. In
light of the risks of falling into indeterminacy when raising trend in‡ation, however, the pros
and cons of undertaking this policy move must be carefully assessed.
This paper contributes to this debate by conducting a variety of experiments designed to
disentangle the e¤ects of systematic monetary policy and trend in‡ation on the probability of
determinacy in the U.S. economy. To achieve this goal, we combine the policy rule estimated by
1An alternative view emphasizes the change in volatility of the U.S. macroeconomic shocks. See for instance
Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa (2008) and Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008).
1CG with a plausibly calibrated operational medium scale model à la Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005). Medium scale frameworks like those popularized by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004), Christiano et al. (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2007) have been widely adopted
by research centers and academic circles for some years now. Such frameworks provide a natural
benchmark with which to investigate the role played by monetary policy and trend in‡ation
in the economy’s attainment of the Great Moderation. The world as represented by these
medium-scale frameworks is characterized by a number of nominal and real frictions, whose
importance in magnifying or dampening the role of trend in‡ation and systematic monetary
policy is investigated in this paper.
Our main …nding gives robust support to changes in systematic monetary policy as the
su¢cient factor to explain the conquest of U.S. in‡ation. Diversely, trend in‡ation is shown to
exert a modest in‡uence on the likelihood of falling in the indeterminacy region. This in‡uence
is con…ned to the last years of the 1970s, a phase in which trend in‡ation reached its historical
peak in the post-WWII sample. In particular, our analysis demonstrates the pivotal role of
the change in the Taylor parameter in the Fed interest rate rule. Consequently, the message
popularized by Clarida et al. (2000) re-emerges as the key driver behind the U.S. economy’s
enjoyment of more than two decades of relatively stable macroeconomic conditions.
The degree of wage indexation we assume in the model is a critical determinant of our
results. We investigate all the frictions typically included in medium scale models, and show
that wage indexation substantially dampens the deterioration of the probability of determinacy
caused by an increase in trend in‡ation. We conduct a battery of exercises under di¤erent
calibrations of this parameter and …nd that CG’s result holds true when low values of wage
indexation (less than 0.25) are combined with high values of trend in‡ation (higher than six
percent). To deepen our understanding of the relationship between these two objects, we then
provide fresh estimates of the degree of wage indexation in the U.S. by estimating a time-varying
reduced-form linear model of the relationship between wage and price in‡ation, which we use
to back out the implied degree of wage indexation. We …nd that wage indexation is unstable
over time, i.e., it is high and signi…cant in the 1970s, but it remarkably drops to zero when
entering the Great Moderation sample.2 Our estimated time-varying degree of wage indexation
is found to be highly correlated with an alternative measure of wage indexation constructed by
considering the number of workers covered by the cost-of-living-adjustment clause in their labor
contracts, as in Ragan and Bratsberg (2000). We also document a positive correlation between
wage indexation and the trend in‡ation process obtained by CG. The possible e¤ects of high
realizations of trend in‡ation on the determinacy region are likely to have been dampened by the
relatively high degree of wage indexation occurring in the 1970s. Therefore, we conclude that
empirically plausible measures of wage indexation support the interpretation …rst popularized
by Clarida et al. (2000). Our empirical …ndings can also be interpreted as a call to understand
the e¤ects related to the misspeci…cation of small scale models. In particular, we show that
2This result is in line with the recent …ndings proposed by Hofmann et al. (2010).
2wage indexation and, more generally, labor market frictions are likely to be one of these relevant
ingredients.
We close our analysis by assessing the extent to which an increase in trend in‡ation could
lead to indeterminacy under an aggressive policy, as the one estimated in the U.S. Great
Moderation sample. We …nd that the proposal formulated by Blanchard et al. (2010) to
increase trend in‡ation to four percent would basically leave the likelihood of determinacy
unaltered in a plausibly calibrated setting.
Our paper is structured as follows. The next section investigates the impact of the di¤erent
real and nominal frictions featured in a medium-scale model on the determinacy region, given
a simple Taylor rule. Section 3 provides the factual and counterfactual simulations with which
we isolate the impact of systematic monetary policy vs. trend in‡ation. Section 4 focuses on
the theoretical role of wage indexation and its empirical relevance. Section 5 scrutinizes the
risks associated with the raising of trend in‡ation to four percent, as suggested by Blanchard
et al. (2010). Section 6 concludes.
2 Determinacy: the role of frictions
We use a workhorse medium-scale macroeconomic model (see, e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2004, Christiano et al., 2005, Smets and Wouters, 2007) that extends the standard textbook,
one-sector dynamic stochastic growth model by adding various real and nominal frictions.
Real frictions are monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets, habit formation in
preferences for consumption, variable capital utilization and adjustment costs in investment.
Nominal frictions include Calvo-style nominal price and wage contracts, and backward-looking
indexation in wages. In particular, as is typically assumed in this literature, wage setters that
cannot re-optimize automatically update their nominal wages conditionally on past in‡ation.
Section 4 provides a detailed analysis of what this assumption implies for our results. Following
CG, we do not assume price indexation. As for the remaining parameters, we calibrate our
medium-scale model by exploiting Christiano et al.’s (2005) baseline calibration/estimates,
which we report in Table 1.3
It is of interest to investigate the role played by each friction in shaping the determinacy
region under alternative calibrations of trend in‡ation. In order to do that, we …rst log-linearize
the model around a generic trend in‡ation level. As a reference framework, we use a baseline
small-scale New Keynesian model that features monopolistic competition and price staggering;
we obtain this model by shutting down all the modeled real frictions and wage staggering. We
then investigate how the determinacy region changes by activating one friction at a time. We
undertake this exercise to have a …rst assessment of the relative importance of the di¤erent
frictions that characterize our medium-scale model.
3A complete description of the structural equations and of the parameter calibration used in this paper is
contained in an Appendix that is available upon request.
3The model is closed by means of a very simple Taylor rule, expressed in log-deviations from
the steady state values:
rt = ￿￿￿t; (1)
where the policy rate rt simply responds to the deviation of in‡ation from the long-run in‡ation
objective (i.e., trend in‡ation). Woodford (2003) shows that when such a rule is coupled
with the simplest two-equation New Keynesian model with zero trend in‡ation, the "Taylor
principle" arises, i.e., ￿￿ > 1 is the simple and intuitive necessary condition for the existence of
a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Some recent contributions (Hornstein and Wolman,
2005, Kiley, 2007, and Ascari and Ropele, 2009), however, demonstrate that the Taylor principle
fails when positive trend in‡ation is considered, in that models embedding positive trend
in‡ation require a stronger response of the policy rate to in‡ation to guarantee the determinacy
of the equilibrium.
The solid line in Figure 1a) plots the minimum level of ￿￿ necessary to ensure a unique
rational expectation equilibrium as a function of trend in‡ation in a simple New Keynesian
model that exclusively features monopolistic competition and price staggering (without both
real frictions and wage staggering). The determinacy region lies above the line (i.e., ￿￿ values
larger than the minimum), while the indeterminacy region lies below the line (￿￿ values lower
than the minimum). Clearly, the minimum level of ￿￿ required for a unique rational expectation
equilibrium is equal to 1, when trend in‡ation is zero. However, it increases quite rapidly with
trend in‡ation. For example, for values of trend in‡ation around 3%, ￿￿ should be larger than
5.
Figure 1a) also visualizes the e¤ects of adding one real friction at a time to those (i.e.,
variable capital utilization, investment adjustment costs and habit in consumption) present in
our medium-scale New Keynesian model. All these frictions have the same qualitative e¤ect:
they reduce the sensitivity to di¤ering levels of trend in‡ation of the minimum response to
in‡ation necessary to achieve determinacy. As a result, the line ‡attens with respect to the
solid one. Thus, for any level of trend in‡ation larger than 1, the minimum ￿￿ is lower whenever
one of these frictions is present. From a quantitative point of view, the investment adjustment
costs have the largest e¤ect, while variable capital utilization has the smallest.
Figure 1b) displays the e¤ects of introducing wage stickiness into a standard simple New
Keynesian model without real frictions. Wage stickiness qualitatively shrinks the determinacy
region as trend in‡ation increases. This e¤ect is quantitatively very powerful. Wage stickiness
makes the determinacy region so sensitive to the trend in‡ation level that the monetary author-
ity needs to dramatically increase the response to in‡ation to ensure a determinate equilibrium.
For example, for a 4% level of trend in‡ation, ￿￿ should be larger than 25. On the other hand,
indexation is very e¤ective in counteracting the e¤ects of introducing wage stickiness. A 50%
indexation clause is su¢cient to move the determinacy line quite a long way towards the one
that features no wage stickiness. Full indexation in wages would completely o¤set the interac-
tion between trend in‡ation and nominal wage stickiness. Consequently, the line would simply
4overlay to solid one.
Figure 1c) shows the di¤erence between our operational medium-scale model and a simple
New Keynesian model, as in CG. Our basic calibration assumes full indexation in wages as in
Christiano et al. (2005). In Figure 1c), the e¤ects of the three real frictions on the sensitivity of
the minimum policy response to in‡ation is clearly evident. The line is very ‡at, and moderate
levels of trend in‡ation exert only very minor e¤ects on the minimum ￿￿ necessary to induce
a unique rational expectation equilibrium: the Taylor principle would still be a good rule-of-
thumb in such a model. In contrast, a model without real frictions, such as that used in CG,
is much more sensitive to the level of trend in‡ation.
Finally, Figure 1d) shows the e¤ects of wage stickiness and wage indexation in a model with
frictions. Qualitatively, wage stickiness has the same e¤ects as in a model without frictions:
it increases the sensitivity of the determinacy region to trend in‡ation levels. However, in a
model with frictions this e¤ect is much milder, i.e., the curve is ‡atter, and indexation is even
more e¤ective in counteracting the e¤ects of wage stickiness.
To summarize, Figures 1a)-1d) provide a synthesis of the relationship between trend in-
‡ation, wage rigidities, and determinacy. All else being equal, trend in‡ation shrinks the
determinacy region. However, its impact turns out to be quite limited when the usual "bells
and whistles" present in medium-scale models are considered. In this sense, investment ad-
justment costs exert a substantial e¤ect on the determinacy frontier. Wage stickiness clearly
"works against determinacy". Its e¤ect appears to be quantitatively important in a small-scale
version of the model, but it weakens when more nominal and real frictions are embedded in the
analysis. In contrast, wage indexation widens the determinacy region, and its impact appears
to be substantial in both the small-scale and the medium-scale versions of the model.
3 Determinacy: the role of trend in‡ation vs. monetary
policy
This section engages in a battery of exercises to assess the impact of trend in‡ation vs. monetary
policy on the likelihood of a determinate rational expectations equilibrium. Before conducting
these exercises, we follow Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011 a,b) and estimate a policy rule
that features time-varying i) coe¢cients and ii) trend in‡ation. We then exploit this estimated
rule in our simulations.
3.1 Estimated policy rule and factual simulations
We replicate the estimates concerning the U.S. policy rule obtained by CG. Such rule features
time-varying coe¢cients to account for the variations in the U.S. monetary policy since the
early-1970s. The rule reads as follows:
5rt = ct + (1   ￿1;t   ￿2;t)(￿￿;tEt￿t+2 + ￿gy;tEtgyt + ￿x;tEtxt) + ￿1;trt 1 + ￿2;trt 2 + "t (2)
where
ct = (1   ￿1;t   ￿2;t)[(1   ￿￿;t)￿t + !t   ￿gy;tgy   ￿x;txt] (3)
Eq. (2) describes the policy rate rt as responding to a time varying intercept ct, to expected
in‡ation over the subsequent two quarters Et￿t+2, to expected output growth Etgyt and ex-
pected output gap Etxt in the current quarter. Following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011
a,b), we allow for two lags of the policy rate to achieve a better empirical …t of the observed
policy rate dynamics. The policy shock "t is assumed to be a white-noise process. Regarding
(3): ￿t is the target rate of in‡ation, !t is the equilibrium real interest rate, gy is the target
rate of growth of real GDP, and xt is the target level of the output gap. As in Boivin (2006)
and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011 a,b), policy parameters are assumed to follow random
walk processes. Greenbook forecasts of current and future macroeconomic variables prepared
by sta¤ members of the Federal Reserve are employed in the estimation. We stick to CG’s sam-
ple choice, i.e., March 1969-December 2002, and replicate their results.4 We …nd compelling
evidence in favor of changes in the policy coe¢cients. In particular, after 1982 the policy rule
features an increase in the response to in‡ation and output growth, and also in the overall
degree of interest rate smoothing. Eq. (3) allows the recovery of an estimate of time-varying
trend in‡ation ￿t:5 The estimated trend in‡ation process displays substantial variations over
time. In particular, it starts from a value close to three percent in 1969, then it gradually
increases until the end of the 1970s, where it reaches values close to eight percent. Then, a
substantial drop occurs during the Volcker disin‡ation, and a continuous decline towards two
percent follows. Compelling evidence in favor of changes in trend in‡ation is also found by
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), Ireland (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), and Cogley et al.
(2010).
We now feed in the estimated time-varying policy rule (2) and the time-varying trend
in‡ation in our medium-scale model to compute the probability of the US economy’s being
in determinate state in each quarter of the sample.6 The solid line in Figure 2 depicts the
4The evolution of the coe¢cients and processes in equations (2) and (3) is estimated via the Kalman
smoother. Two breaks in the volatility of shocks to the parameters are modeled, one in 1979 and the other one
in 1982. A detailed description of the data employed in this analysis may be found in CG.
5The measure of time-varying trend in‡ation is extracted from the time varying constant - see eq. (3) -
conditional on some additional assumptions on the equilibrium real interest rate and the Federal Reserve’s
targets for real GDP growth and the output gap. Such targets are approximated by computing the trend
measures of the observables via the Hodrick-Prescott …lter (smoothing weight: 1,600), which we then feed into
(3) along with the estimated time-varying parameters, to extract the trend in‡ation measure.
6Said probabilities are computed as follows. We draw a realization from the estimated distributions of each
policy coe¢cient and the time-varying in‡ation rate in each given period. Conditionally on these realizations,
we check whether the economy features a unique rational expectations equilibrium. We repeat this exercise
10,000 times, and compute the time-dependent probability of determinacy as the ratio between the number of
times we veri…ed that the equilibrium is unique and the total number of draws.
6outcome of our computations. Recall that the evolution of such probability over time depends
on the time-dependence both of the monetary policy coe¢cients and of trend in‡ation. This
Figure clearly shows that, according to the estimates of the policy reaction function and of trend
in‡ation, a medium-scale macroeconomic model would predict a low probability of determinacy
exclusively in the 1975-1980 sample. This result is similar to CG’s, who condition their analysis
on a smaller-scale model than ours.
Thus, one could be tempted to conclude that trend in‡ation matters when it is high (1975-
1980) and does not matter when it is low (Great Moderation). However, this conclusion cannot
be granted merely on the basis of the solid line, because both trend in‡ation and monetary
policy coe¢cients ‡uctuate in any given period. The 1975-1980 sample is a period of high
trend in‡ation and weak monetary policy response to aggregate variables, while the Great
Moderation period presents the opposite combination. The main aim of our research is to
ascertain how much of the probability of determinacy can be attributed to the systematic
component of monetary policy and how much to the level of trend in‡ation. We thus engage in
counterfactual exercises that feature di¤erent combinations of systematic policy (weak, strong)
and of trend in‡ation (high, low) to shed light on this issue.
3.2 Counterfactual exercises
3.2.1 The role of trend in‡ation
The …rst counterfactual exercise aims at assessing the relevance of changes in trend in‡ation
alone in generating indeterminacy of the rational expectation equilibrium. More precisely, we
address the following question:
What is the impact of trend in‡ation on the probability of determinacy conditional
on the estimated policy rule?
Accordingly, we employ the estimated time-varying policy rule, and we consider two sce-
narios for trend in‡ation. The …rst features a …xed in‡ation target set at six percent (roughly
the average in‡ation rate in the pre-Volcker period). The second features a …xed in‡ation
target calibrated at three percent (roughly the average in‡ation rate during the Great Modera-
tion). These scenarios are compared with the previously scrutinized case, where trend in‡ation
changed in every quarter.
The outcomes for each scenario are presented in Figure 2. Recall that these cases share
the same evolution in the policy coe¢cients. Therefore, di¤erences between the probabilities
must be driven by the three di¤ering trend in‡ation processes. More precisely, the larger
the impact exerted by trend in‡ation on the computed probabilities, the larger the di¤erence
should be between the three lines displayed in Figure 2. As a matter of fact, the evolution of
the computed probabilities di¤ers clearly exclusively in the pre-Volcker period. Moreover, our
simulations show that a high level of trend in‡ation, i.e. 6%, would have exerted a virtually
7zero-impact during the Great Moderation. In other words, during this phase the probability of
determinacy is de facto independent from trend in‡ation, as shown by the similarity between
the estimated probabilities. Hence, diversely from CG, we …nd that the impact of trend in‡ation
on the probability that the US economy has been in a determinate equilibrium is negligible in
the post-Volcker period.
To summarize, trend in‡ation matters only conditionally on a weak monetary policy rule.
In this case, high (6%) and low (3%) trend in‡ation would deliver a substantial di¤erence in
the estimated probability of determinacy. However, when the monetary policy rule features
a strong reaction to in‡ation and output growth, as in the Great Moderation sample, trend
in‡ation has no e¤ects on the probability of determinacy. Figure 2 thus suggests that an
aggressive monetary policy may neutralize the e¤ects of trend in‡ation, that is, policy plays a
dominant role with respect to trend in‡ation. The next sections corroborate this result.
3.2.2 The role of policy
To ascertain the e¤ects of trend in‡ation alone, the previous analysis investigated the e¤ects
of di¤ering (high and low) trend in‡ation levels given the estimated time-varying policy rule.
To isolate the e¤ect of policy per se, we now conduct a specular exercise where we analyze the
e¤ect of di¤ering policies given the estimated time-varying trend in‡ation. We thus ask the
following question:
What is the impact of the policy rule on the probability of determinacy conditional
on the estimated time-varying trend in‡ation?
We then set up the following exercise. We move from our rule with time-varying coe¢cients




such rules with the pre-1979 vs. post-1982 point estimates obtained by CG (see their Table
1, under "Mixed Taylor rule"). We then couple our medium-scale macroeconomic model with
each of these estimated policy rules in turn. As for trend in‡ation, we consider the estimated
time-varying process ￿t as described by eq. (3).
Figure 3 depicts our computed probabilities. Recall that, diversely from Figure 2 above,
the two scenarios in Figure 3 share the same evolution of time-varying trend in‡ation (from
high levels in the 1970s to low levels in the 1990s) and di¤erent policy parameters (pre-Volcker
vs. post-Volcker). Therefore, di¤erences between the probabilities, if present, must be driven
by the two di¤erent policies. Intriguingly, the two scenarios tell quite heterogeneous stories.
The probability of determinacy associated with the pre-1979 policy has an average value above
0.30, while the more aggressive post-1982 policy rule yields an average value above 0.70. Both
probabilities turn out to be very stable over time. In other words, for a given constant policy
rule, we do not observe any changes in the probability of determinacy, despite dramatic changes
in trend in‡ation. The e¤ect of trend in‡ation is thus marginally visible in (and con…ned to)
8the period 1977-1983. Overall, however, the impact of the time-varying in‡ation process is
marginal.
Our …ndings reveal the following. Had the Fed maintained a constantly weak monetary
policy in the pre-1979 sample, and had it switched to a constantly aggressive monetary policy in
the post-1979 phase, we would have registered a switch from a state of indeterminacy to a state
of uniqueness for whatever value of trend in‡ation (in the range of its historical realizations).
Hence, our results o¤er solid support to the role played by systematic monetary policy in
anchoring in‡ation expectations, a result which corroborates that in Clarida et al. (2000).
3.2.3 The role of policy coe¢cients
The previous Section demonstrates the prominent role of the policy switch in inducing determi-
nacy in an environment that admits time-varying trend in‡ation. It is of interest to distinguish
the role that the coe¢cients in the monetary policy rule play in delivering our results. In
particular, given the debate in the literature, we are actually mostly interested in the Taylor
coe¢cient, i.e., the response of policy to in‡ation. Clarida et al. (2000) point to the weak
monetary policy response to in‡ation as the main driver of the Great In‡ation period.
We thus run counterfactual experiments to assess the role of the di¤erent coe¢cients in the
Fed’s monetary policy rules (2). The precise question in this Section is:
All else being equal, what is the impact, in isolation, of each policy rule’s coe¢cient
on the probability of determinacy?
To answer this question, we examine how the probabilities of determinacy are a¤ected by
counterfactually …xing all the monetary policy coe¢cients according to the pre-’79 estimates,
and then switching a single policy rule coe¢cient at a time to its post-’82 estimate. As in our
previous exercises, we model trend in‡ation as a time-varying process in accordance with eq.
(3). Figure 4 displays our results. Recall that the two lines in each panel di¤er merely by a
single coe¢cient in the policy rule: the further apart the two lines are, the more the coe¢cient
matters.
Figure 4 (top-left panel) clearly shows that a shift in ￿￿ is su¢cient to determine the switch
from a low probability of determinacy in the Great In‡ation period to a high probability of de-
terminacy in the Great Moderation period. Interestingly enough, the Taylor parameter proves
to be the only one that substantially in‡uences the probability of determinacy. Perturbations
in the remaining policy coe¢cients imply much milder changes in such probability. In other
words, an increase in the Fed’s response to in‡ation alone is su¢cient to insure determinacy,
regardless of trend in‡ation (at least when a calibration consistent with its historical levels
is employed). Clarida et al.’s (2000) result is simply restored in an operational medium-scale
macroeconomic model that features time-varying trend in‡ation.
94 The role of wage indexation
The medium-scale model includes a number of features that are not present in the baseline New
Keynesian framework. One may then wonder which friction, or set of frictions, is responsible
for the discrepancy between CG’s results and ours. We extensively scrutinized the role of each
nominal and real friction in the model at work and veri…ed that there is a single key ingredient
behind our results: wage indexation. Wage indexation insures households against the negative
welfare e¤ects generated by an increase in the price level, in that it allows them to keep up
with their desired level of real expenditures independently of the level of trend in‡ation. In
particular, the higher wage indexation is, the less important trend in‡ation is in a¤ecting
the size of the determinacy region of the policy rule. It is accordingly somewhat natural to
investigate di¤erent scenarios characterized by alternative degrees of indexation.
Figure 5 displays the probability of determinacy (conditional on …xed policies and time-
varying trend in‡ation) for di¤ering degrees of wage indexation. Evidently, the degree of wage
indexation is critical to our result.7 Our baseline calibration (i.e., full wage indexation, as in
Christiano et al., 2005) clearly points toward systematic monetary policy as the only driver
of the probability of determinacy. Our results hold true for a variety of calibrations of the
indexation parameter. On reduction of wage indexation to 0.58 (panel d) in Figure 5), the
“Taylor parameter only” story is still supported by our simulations. The impact of trend
in‡ation is minor and exclusively a¤ect the period 1977-1983, in which the low frequency
component of in‡ation recorded its highest values in the investigated sample. The probability
of the US economy’s being in a state of determinacy remains above 0.5 irrespective of the trend
in‡ation values consistent with historical realizations. A drastically di¤erent result is obtained
when we calibrate the degree of wage indexation to 0.25 (see panel b)). In this case, high trend
in‡ation dramatically reduces the probability of determinacy, even conditional on the post-82
policy rule. This last …nding is a fortiori supported by the analysis undertaken with zero wage
indexation. Interestingly, trend in‡ation does not seem to a¤ect the probability of determinacy
associated with a weak systematic policy conduct. Even more surprisingly, for very low values
of wage indexation, the aggressive post-1982 policy induces a lower probability of determinacy
than does the weaker pre-1979 policy.8
To summarize, when high wage indexation prevails, the e¤ect played by trend in‡ation
is small. Consequently, changes in systematic policy are su¢cient to engineer a switch to
a unique rational expectations equilibrium in a medium scale macroeconomic model. When
wage indexation is low, trend in‡ation gains power and substantially a¤ects the determinacy
7Note that this would also be true for price indexation, as already noted by CG. However, to compare
our results with CG, we stick to their baseline assumption of no indexation in prices. Since CG assume a
competitive labor market and ‡exible wages, they obviously do not analyze the role wage indexation.
8The fact that indexation counteracts the e¤ects of trend in‡ation on the model dynamics and determinacy
of the rational expectation equilibrium has been already investigated by Ascari (2004), Ascari and Ropele
(2009) and CG. When price/wage indexation is full, the e¤ects of trend in‡ation on the dynamics of the model
are merely muted.
10region, a …nding already stressed by CG. Our results suggest that the interaction between
monetary policy and wage indexation is crucial for a correct understanding of the evolution
of U.S. macroeconomic dynamics. We provide novel evidence on wage indexation in the next
section.
4.1 Empirical relevance of the role of wage indexation
We now turn to the empirical assessment of the relevance of the e¤ects of wage indexation
described above. To do so, we feed our macroeconomic model with an estimate of the degree of
wage indexation in the United States. Wage indexation in this model is likely to be a reduced-
form coe¢cient, one that possibly changes over time as a result of variations in economic
conditions. Therefore, coherently with our exercises so far, we will consider time-dependent
measures of wage indexation. We will then re-compute the probability of determinacy (as
in our previous sections) conditional on these evolving estimated degrees of wage indexation,
rather than sticking to a calibrated …xed-value.
We consider two measures of wage indexation. We obtain the …rst measure by relating wage
in‡ation to price in‡ation via a dynamic model as in Hofmann et al. (2010). In particular, we
estimate the following equation with U.S. data, 1948:I-2010:III:
￿
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t is wage in‡ation, and ￿t stands for price in‡ation.9 Lags in eq. (4) capture wage
in‡ation persistence in a reduced form fashion. As in Hofmann et al. (2010), the degree of










Equation (4) is estimated with rolling techniques, which allow us to track the time-evolution
of the reduced-form coe¢cients ￿￿
k and ￿w
j . We can then recover a time-varying measure of the
degree of wage indexation, which we term WIt.10 We then feed our medium-scale model with
our estimated WIt (mean realizations), and re-conduct our formerly presented exercises.
9In‡ation rates are computed by considering the quarterly growth rate of nominal wages (hourly compen-
sation in the non-farm business sector) and the GDP price de‡ator, respectively. The source of the data is the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ website.
10We set J = 3 to eliminate the serial correlation as detected by the Breusch-Godfrey LM test at a 5%
con…dence level. A search for the signi…cant lagged price in‡ation regressors led us to set K = 1. The width of
our windows is …xed to 64 quarters. The computation of the time-varying con…dence interval is undertaken via
boostrapping techniques. For each window, we proceed as follows. First, we estimate eq. (4) with OLS. Second,
we …x the parameter values of the regressors of eq. (4) to their OLS estimates, and we generate pseudo-data for
wage in‡ation by sampling with replacement a number of realizations from the vector of residuals estimated at
the …rst round. Third, we employ these pseudo-data to estimate eq. (4) with OLS, we compute the wage index
(4), and we store it. Steps two and three are repeated 500 times for each window. We then pick the 5th and
95th percentiles along with the mean of the window-speci…c empirical distribution, and we move to the next
window.
11Our second measure relies on …gures coming from micro data. Such data regard individuals
covered by the cost-of-living-adjustment (henceforth COLA) clause in their labor contracts.11
Ragan and Bratsberg (2000) collect COLA coverage based on 22 years of U.S. data and regard-
ing 32 private-sector industries. They also provide an aggregate measure of COLA coverage
(see their Figure 1, p. 306). COLA coverage peaked in 1976, a year in which 61% of workers
were covered by major collective bargaining contracts. Subsequently, the overall COLA rate
fell to 22% at the end of 1995, when COLA statistics were last collected. Ragan and Bratsberg
(2000) use these data to estimate a model of the determinants of COLA coverage. In line
with a variety of previous studies (see reference therein), they …nd that the major determinant
of COLA coverage is in‡ation uncertainty (measured as the standard deviation of in‡ation
expectations in the Livingstone Survey). Given the very high correlation between the level of
in‡ation and its standard deviation in the U.S. data (see, e.g., Ball, 1992), this robust evidence
is very relevant for our analysis. It suggests that the degree of wage indexation (as measured by
COLA coverage) should be treated as time-varying, because it is high when in‡ation is volatile
(and high), while it is low when in‡ation is stable (and low), an empirical …nding in line with
the results provided by Holland (1986).12 We will return to this correlation later.
Figure 6 shows our estimates of the degree of wage indexation coming from macro data
using (5), and the dynamics of COLA coverage from micro data. The two measures of the
degree of wage indexation are statistically di¤erent, because the COLA coverage lies outside
the con…dence bands of our estimates of WIt for a number of periods in the sample (see panel
a) in Figure 6). Both measures assume the highest values when our measure of trend in‡ation
peaks, i.e., in the 1977-1983 sample period. Recall that Figure 5 demonstrates that high trend
in‡ation in that period would have mattered only if wage indexation had been low. However,
this is not the case in our estimates, according to which the case of panel d) is more plausible
than that of panel a) in Figure 5. This is clearly demonstrated in Figure 7, where we perform
the same exercises as in Figure 5 (…x policy and time-varying trend in‡ation) and allow for a
time varying indexation as obtained both from our macroeconomic estimates13 (panel a)) and
from the COLA coverage (panel b)). Trend in‡ation has only marginal e¤ects in the 1977-1983
sample, but, conditional on a strong policy response to in‡ation, the likelihood of determinacy
remains well above 0.5 in both cases. In contrast, a weak policy response would very likely
result in an indeterminate equilibrium regardless of the level of trend in‡ation.
11The COLA indicator is computed as the ratio between the number of unionized workers with contracts
featuring a cost-of-living adjustment clause over the total number of unionized workers (both conditional on
contractual agreements involving over 1,000 workers). Therefore, it is a measure of prevalence of wage index-
ation more than a degree of wage indexation. However, as stressed by Holland (1988), a higher prevalence of
indexation implies a higher average degree of indexation.
12The COLA indicator is a measure of explicit indexation regarding unionized workers, who constitute a
minority in the U.S. labor market (typically less than 25%). However, as shown by Holland (1988), the
responsiveness of non-unionized workers’ nominal wages to price level shocks is very similar to that of unionized
workers’, due to implicit indexation. Therefore, one can take COLA as a proxy for explicit and implicit wage
indexation in the entire U.S. economy.
13When insigni…cant, the value of WIt was set to zero in our simulations.
12Finally, Figure 8 displays what can be considered as our …nal estimates, which we con-
structed by letting policy parameters, trend in‡ation and the degree of wage indexation vary
over time. Again, our aim is to compute the probability of the US economy’s being in a de-
terminate state. We do so by alternatively considering the two measures of wage indexation
presented above. Despite the di¤erences between said measures, the two estimates of our prob-
ability are very similar, a …nding that stresses the robustness of our results under empirically
relevant degrees of wage indexation. Again, the only historical period in which our analysis
identify a high likelihood of indeterminacy is the second half of the 1970s, a period characterized
by skyrocketing trend in‡ation and weak systematic monetary policy.
Our empirical …ndings lead us to conclude the following. The e¤ect that the high trend
in‡ation rate of the 1970s could potentially have played was in fact substantially dampened
by a high degree of wage indexation. Such indexation signi…cantly dropped in the 1980s and
1990s, but trend in‡ation fell as well. Overall, the impact of trend in‡ation in a plausibly
calibrated medium scale model is likely to be mild at best. However, our analysis calls for
further empirical work to investigate the occurrence of and the change in wage indexation over
time and its interaction with (possibly, its dependence) trend in‡ation and the policy regime
in place.
5 On the risks of raising trend in‡ation
Blanchard et al. (2010) have recently proposed to increase trend in‡ation to four percent.
Faced with negative shocks that depress the real side of the economy, the Federal Reserve
typically reacts by lowering the cost of money to boost the economy and thus bring real GDP
growth back to its target. Clearly, a trend in‡ation of four percent would give policy makers
more room for manoeuvre than a target set to two percent, because the latter implies a much
higher probability of hitting the zero-lower bound. The recent …nancial crisis is already a
textbook example of this kind of scenario.
Of course, one must weight all pros and cons related to a proposal like Blanchard et al.’s.
CG’s paper importantly makes us understand that rising trend in‡ation in a small-scale world
is very risky, because the likelihood of falling into a multiple-equilibria situation is high even
conditionally on an aggressive monetary policy conduct. Our paper shows that a medium-scale
model may lead to di¤erent conclusions on the basis of frictions in the labor markets, and
speci…cally of wage indexation to past in‡ation. It is therefore of interest to understand what
risks lie in the raising of trend in‡ation to four percent in a medium-scale world like ours. We
answer this question by simulating the probability of determinacy as a function of di¤ering
values of trend in‡ation. In line with our previous exercises, we conduct this experiment under
four alternative degrees of wage indexation to assess its impact on our results.
Figure 9 displays our probabilities, assuming the post-82 policy. In a world in which wage
indexation is absent, it would be fairly risky to increase the in‡ation target to four percent.
13According to our simulations, this would imply an approximate 30% decrease in the probability
of determinacy, driving said probability to around 50%. This prediction, however, proves to
be extremely sensitive to variations in the degree of wage indexation. A moderate amount
of wage indexation, i.e. 25%, is enough to substantially increase the probability of anchoring
in‡ation expectations even under a four-percent trend in‡ation. This probability monotoni-
cally increases with the degree of wage indexation, whose marginal returns decrease along this
dimension. Interestingly, CG’s policy implication is re-established for higher values of trend
in‡ation, e.g., a wage indexation of about 50% would not be enough to keep the probability of
determinacy over 1/2 in correspondence to an eight-percent in‡ation target. However, we reit-
erate that, under a four-percent trend in‡ation rate, it would be very likely for the economy to
feature a unique rational expectation equilibrium even under moderate amounts of indexation.
It is worth stressing that the probabilities displayed in Figure 9 are, if anything, conservative
estimates of the true probabilities of determinacy.
Two elements are clearly working against determinacy. First, in conducting our exercises
we allow for an increase in trend in‡ation while holding wage indexation …xed. This working
hypothesis appears to be counterfactual. The degree of wage indexation is, more plausibly,
a reduced-form coe¢cient that correlates positively with the average level of price in‡ation.
Fresh evidence along these lines is provided by Hofmann et al. (2010) and by ourselves in
the present paper. As we show, such evidence squares with the COLA coverage presented
and discussed in section 4.1. To provide further evidence of this correlation, we regress the
COLA indicator on its own past values and on the trend in‡ation estimates provided by CG.
We …nd a signi…cant and positive correlation between trend in‡ation and wage indexation.
The coe¢cient on contemporaneous trend in‡ation reads 0.29, with a p-value associated to the
t-statistic of less than 0.01.14 While not assigning any causal interpretation to this …nding, we
interpret it as corroborating the fact that, historically, increases in trend in‡ation rate go hand
in hand with increases in wage indexation. This evidence is consistent with Holland (1995),
who runs a variety of Granger-causality type regressions and …nds that increases in in‡ation
precede increases in wage indexation. These results cast doubts on the assumption that wage
indexation is a ’structural parameter’ in the sense of Lucas (1976). This …nding mirrors that in
Benati (2008) on the degree of price indexation, which is also found to be sensitive to changes
in policy conducts in a variety of industrialized countries.
Second, the results in Figure 9 (and those presented in this paper in general) are obtained
under the assumption of zero price indexation. If we admitted a positive degree of price
indexation, the probabilities displayed in Figure 9 would increase because of the positive impact
exerted by price indexation on the width of the determinacy territory, a well known result
in the literature (see Ascari and Ropele 2009 and CG). Logically, one would expect price
14Model estimated via OLS. A White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix was employed to ensure
robustness. Yearly observations of trend in‡ation were obtained by computation of within-year averages for
the trend in‡ation estimates provided by CG. Standard diagnostics con…rmed the absence of serial correlation
of the error term. Further details on this estimation are available upon request.
14indexation to increase following an increase in average in‡ation in the economy, a prediction
that is corroborated by Benati (2008). Therefore, we conclude that the simulated probabilities
presented in Figure 9 should be interpreted as ’lower bounds’, i.e., the true probabilities in this
medium-scale world are likely to be even higher than those depicted there.
As recalled at the beginning of this paper, Blanchard et al. (2010) ask if it is more di¢cult
to anchor expectations at 4 percent than at 2 percent. In light of our simulations, our answer
is negative.
6 Conclusions
We combine an estimated monetary policy rule that features time-varying trend in‡ation and
stochastic coe¢cients with the medium scale model popularized by Christiano et al. (2005),
which we calibrate with their estimates. We conduct a variety of counterfactual experiments
to isolate the in‡uence of trend in‡ation on the likelihood of the US economy’s being in a
determinate state. We show that even with positive trend in‡ation, the Taylor principle is
su¢cient to guarantee a determinate equilibrium. In other words, trend in‡ation does not
seem to play a relevant role in determining the probability determinacy. Our results di¤er from
those proposed by CG, who indicate the reduction in trend in‡ation as a necessary ingredient
for the switch to a more moderate macroeconomic environment.
From a policy standpoint, our results demonstrate that Blanchard et al.’s (2010) proposal to
raise the in‡ation target to four percent to avoid a liquidity-trap during economic downturns
is likely not to increase economic instability. From a normative perspective, however, more
research is needed to understand whether such a choice would actually be optimal from a welfare
standpoint. An interesting investigation along this dimension has recently been proposed by
Coibon et al. (2010).
We …nd wage indexation to be the key element in the gap between our results and CG’s. A
high degree of wage indexation dampens the role played by trend in‡ation and, consequently,
reinforces that played by systematic monetary policy. The literature on wage indexation (e.g.,
Ragan and Bratsberg, 2000, and the references therein) shows a positive correlation between
the degree of wage indexation and in‡ation uncertainty. This suggests a negative correlation
between the degree of wage indexation and monetary policy aggressiveness towards in‡ation
stabilization. Indeed, both the fresh empirical evidence on macrodata provided in this paper,
and the correlation between the measure of COLA coverage in Ragan and Bratsberg (2000)
and the trend in‡ation estimate in CG support this pattern. As a consequence, our results
suggest that high in‡ation has been historically coupled with a high degree of wage indexation
that dampened the impact of trend in‡ation on the determinacy region. Given that di¤erences
in unionization have been pretty dramatic across industrialized countries for the last decades,
it would be of interest to conduct a cross-country empirical investigation with the aim of
quantifying the di¤erent role played by wage indexation in di¤ering countries.
15Our current understanding of the wage indexation mechanism at a macroeconomic level
is limited. Some interesting research on the interaction between monetary policy and labor
market frictions has recently been proposed by a variety of authors (e.g., Krause and Lubik,
2007, Gertler and Trigari, 2009 , Blanchard and Galí, 2010). In light of our results, we believe
that future investigations should aim to endogenize the wage indexation mechanism and to
understand its determinants.
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a) Real frictions and determinacy in a
simple New Keynesian model.

















b) Wage stickiness and determinacy in a
simple New Keynesian model.
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c) Determinacy in a simple vs. in a
medium-scale New Keynesian model.

















d) Wage indexation and determinacy in a
medium-scale New Keynesian model.
Figure 1. Minimum Response to In‡ation to Induce Determinacy in a New
Keynesian Model with Positive Trend In‡ation Rates.
19Figure 2. Probability of Determinacy with an Estimated Time-Varying Response
Function by the Federal Reserve. The …gure depicts the probability of determinacy
implied by the distribution of time-varying parameters estimated as described in the text (see
Section 3.1). The dashed (dotted) blue line assumes a constant rate of trend in‡ation of 3
percent (6 percent). The solid black line accounts for the time-varying measure of trend
in‡ation computed as described in the text (Section 3.1).
Figure 3. Probability of Determinacy with Estimated Fixed Policy Responses by
the Federal Reserve. The …gure depicts the probability of determinacy implied by the
estimated …xed coe¢cient-policy rules as in Coibion-Gorodnichenko (2010), Table 1, mixed
Taylor Rule. The volatility of the computed probability is driven by the time-varying trend
in‡ation computed as described in the text (see Section 3.1). The dashed blue line considers a
weak monetary policy. The solid black line takes an aggressive monetary policy into account.
20Figure 4. Probability of Determinacy: The role of policy coe¢cients. Time varying
trend in‡ation employed in our simulations.










































a) No Wage Indexation.










































b) Wage indexation equal to 0.25.










































c) Wage Indexation equal to 0.48.










































d) Wage Indexation equal to 0.58.
Figure 5. Probability of Determinacy with Estimated Fixed Policy Responses by
































Figure 6. Estimated Degrees of Wage Indexation.
a) Role of Wage Indexation, our own
estimates.
b) Role of Wage Indexation, COLA
indicator.
Figure 7: Probability of Determinacy with Estimated Fixed Policy Responses by
the Federal Reserve for estimated degree of indexation.
23Figure 8. Probability of Determinacy with an Estimated Time-Varying Response
Function by the Federal Reserve, time varying trend in‡ation and time varying
degree of indexation.




￿ 1:03 0:25 Time discount rate
￿ 0:36 Share of capital
  0:5827 Fixed cost (guarantee zero pro…ts in steady state)
￿ 0:025 Depreciation of capital
￿ 1 Fraction of wage bill subject to CIA constraint
￿ 6 Elasticity of substitution of di¤erent varieties of goods
~ ￿ 21 Elasticity of substitution of labour services
￿ 0:6 Probability of not setting a new price each period
~ ￿ 0:64 Probability of not setting a new wage each period
b 0:65 Degree of habit persistence
￿0 1:1196 Preference parameter
￿1 0:5393 Preference parameter
￿m 10:62 Intertemporal elasticity of money
￿ 2:48 Investment adjustment cost parameter
~ ￿ 1 Wage indexation
￿ 0 Price indexation
￿1 0:0324 Capital utilization cost function parameter
￿2 0:000324 Capital utilization cost function parameter
z 1 Steady state value of technology shock
￿z 0:979 Serial correlation of technology shock (in log-levels)
￿z 0:0072 Standard deviation of technology shock
￿g 0:96 Serial correlation of demand shock (in log-levels)
￿g 0:02 Standard deviation of demand shock
￿ 0:18 Parameter scaling all exogenous shocks
25